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Abstract—In current IaaS cloud markets, tenant consumers
non-cooperatively compete for cloud resources via demand quan-
tities, and the service quality is offered in a best effort manner.
To better exploit tenant demand correlation, cloud brokerage
services provide cloud resource multiplexing so as to earn
proﬁts by receiving volume discounts from cloud providers. A
fundamental but daunting problem facing a tenant consumer
is competitive resource procurements via cloud brokerage. In
this paper, we investigate this problem via non-cooperative game
modeling. In the static game, to maximize the experienced sur-
plus, tenants judiciously select optimal demand responses given
pricing strategies of cloud brokers and complete information of
the other tenants’ demands. We also derive Nash equilibrium of
the non-cooperative game for competitive resource procurements.
Performance evaluation on Nash equilibrium reveals insightful
observations for both theoretical analysis and practical cloud
resource procurements scheme design.
Keywords—Cloud computing, resource allocation, pricing
scheme design, game theory, distributed learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) view of cloud com-
puting is widely adopted by several large cloud providers,
which has fundamentally changed the operation of many
industries [1]–[3]. Indeed, large cloud providers such as
Amazon Web Services [4], Windows Azure [5], and Google
App Engine [6] offer Internet-scale distributed computing
facilities, where tenant users can dynamically reserve cloud
resources including CPU, memory, and bandwidth so as to
satisfy their own service requirements [7]. Tenants including
application developers and small startups potentially reduce
their investment risk and operating cost by renting computing
and storage facilities from the cloud, while cloud providers
beneﬁt ﬁnancially from multiplexing their data center networks
[8]. In such a multi-tenant cloud computing environment,
cloud brokers exploit demand correlation among tenants and
obtain volume discounts from cloud providers via tenant
demand aggregation. Therefore, tenants dynamically procure
resources via cloud brokerage services due to lower offered
price rates. In practice, tenants may be rejected of cloud
services due to the inherent quantity competition among tenant
consumers. In particular, tenant consumers judiciously decide
optimal demand responses via tenant surplus maximization.
Such demand competition, largely unexplored, fundamentally
determines the tenant demand dynamics, which in turn affects
the optimal pricing rules of both cloud brokers and the cloud
provider in an interrelated market.
In this paper, we consider resource procurements from cloud
brokers, and tackle the problem of tenant demand competition
and competitive cloud resource procurements with a realistic
broker pricing policy. In a practical cloud market, resource
demands and prices will be cleared at an equilibrium level,
where tenant consumers maximize their surplus and cloud
brokers optimize the collected revenue given optimal tenant
demand responses. Speciﬁcally, we propose a non-cooperative
game to tractably investigate the competition among tenants
for dynamic resource procurements and its impact on broker
revenue and pricing scheme design. In this study of compet-
itive cloud resource procurements, our speciﬁc contributions
are three-fold.
In this paper, we build a general game model to realistically
capture broker pricing scheme design. Tenant surplus (i.e.,
tenant utility minus dollar cost) is realistically formulated
to model tenant rationality. We then analytically perform
equilibrium analysis for competitive resource procurements
under the assumption of perfect information. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the system model of competitive cloud resource procurements
via cloud brokerage. We propose a non-cooperative game
and perform equilibrium analysis in Section III. Section IV
validates our model with preliminary evaluation results on
Nash equilibrium. In Section V, we articulate recent advances
in cloud resource pricing. Finally, we present conclusions and
future work in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Cloud Brokers and Tenants
We consider a cloud system with multiple cloud brokers
and a large number of tenant users. Cloud brokers share cloud
resources such as CPU, memory, and bandwidth with tenant
users as sellers. Tenant users as buyers dynamically procure
cloud resources in units of virtual instances. A virtual instance
is a resource bundle with one single resource type or a bundle
of multiple resources. Throughout this paper, we study virtual
instances as units of commodities sold in such a cloud system.
Spot prices are provided by brokers so as to accommodate
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demand dynamics, which is widely used in realistic cloud
markets, such as SpotCloud [9].
Denote byN the number of tenant users in the cloud system.
The number of cloud brokers isM . The broker i sells the cloud
resources at price rate pi per virtual instance. Each broker
provides services to multiple tenants, the demands of which
depend on both the experienced service quality and the price
charged by the cloud cloud brokers. The service quality of
tenants is dependent on network delay (i.e., transmission delay
due to request routing) and queueing delay (i.e., delay incurred
by waiting for the service of the cloud broker). To this end, the
queueing delay is implicitly considered in the pricing policy
of each cloud broker, which will be elaborated in Section III.
We explicitly consider network delay in the utility function of
tenant users.
B. Tenant Competition in an Oligopoly Market
We approach the problem of dynamic cloud resource pro-
curements via noncooperative game modeling of tenant users.
In microeconomics, oligopoly describes a situation in which
a small number of companies (i.e., oligopolists) dominate the
entire market. This is what happens in current cloud markets,
where several large companies such as Amazon and Microsoft
dominantly occupy the market share with few cloud brokers.
Under this market structure, the few cloud brokers own the
control of cloud resource prices to tenant consumers. The de-
cision making of each tenant user is to reserve cloud resources
properly so as to maximize their individual beneﬁts, which is
quantiﬁed by tenant surplus in our study. Under the assumption
of observable prices of different cloud brokers, the tenant
users compete with each other and make demand requests in a
noncooperative manner. The competition among tenant users
is in terms of the resource demand, which is determined by
the utility obtained from requested virtual instances and the
price charged by cloud brokers. Each tenant user dynamically
learns the equilibrium by adapting the amount of reserved
cloud resources to the strategies of other tenant users. Indeed,
tenants may also obtain cloud resources from cloud providers
directly, but here we focus our discussions on cloud brokers
due to the lower offered price rates [10].
III. TENANT COMPETITION FOR CLOUD RESOURCE
PROCUREMENTS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we build a game theoretic model for competi-
tive resource procurements among tenant users. We ﬁrst deﬁne
the pricing scheme of cloud brokers and formulate our tenant
surplus deﬁntion. Based on this, we propose a game theoretic
formulation to model the noncooperative competition among
tenant users. However, this static game assumes that each
tenant user possesses perfect information about strategies and
surplus of all the other tenant users. To this end, we propose
a dynamic game formulation, by relaxing the assumption
of perfect information, so as to provide realistic resource
procurement algorithms for tenant consumers.
A. Pricing Model of Data Centers and Tenant Surplus
The commodity sold in the cloud market is in the units of
virtual instances. To model prices offered by cloud broker i,
we consider a realistic pricing function:
pi(di) = α+ β ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dij
⎞
⎠
τ
, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, (1)
where dij is the amount of resources reserved by tenant j
from cloud broker i, and di = [di1, · · · , dij , · · · , diN ]T is the
vector of all resource demands at broker i. This practically
reﬂects the situation that the price increases with the growth
of aggregate demand at one cloud broker due to the limited
amount of cloud resources reserved from cloud providers in
the interrelated market. With the surge of resource prices, the
demand will decrease accordingly. In this manner, the demand
can be maintained at an equilibrium level so as to provide
sufﬁcient service quality as measured by the queueing delay.
Denote by lij the network delay due to tenant j’s resource
procurements from cloud broker i. L represents the maximum
experienced network delay in the entire cloud system. Then,
the utility of unit virtual instance can be modeled as
bij = ln (1 + (L− lij)) , (2)
where L ≥ lij and L represents the maximum tolerated delay
by tenant consumers. Then, the total utility obtained by tenant
user j is
∑M
i=1 bij · dij , with the ﬁnancial cost of
∑M
i=1 bij ·
pi(di). Therefore the surplus of tenant j can be formulated as
follows:
πj(sj) =
M∑
i=1
bij · dij −
M∑
i=1
dij · pi(di)
=
M∑
i=1
bij · dij −
M∑
i=1
dij ·
⎛
⎝α+ β ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dij
⎞
⎠
τ⎞
⎠
(3)
where sj = [d1j , · · · , dij , · · · , dMj ]T is a vector of tenant
user j’s demands from all the cloud brokers.
B. A Static Game and Nash Equilibrium
Based on the tenant surplus formulation in the above, we
can formulate a noncooperative game among competing tenant
users. In a static game, the most fundamental three elements
are players, the strategy of each player, and the payoff of each
player. The players in this game are all the tenant users. The
strategy of each player (e.g., tenant user j) is the demand
vector of resources reserved from different cloud brokers (i.e.,
sj for tenant j). The payoff of each tenant user j is the surplus
earned from the usage of cloud resources (i.e., πj(sj)). We use
Nash equilibrium to solve the game.
The Nash equilibrium of a game is a solution concept in
which no player can increase his own payoff by unilaterally
changing its own strategy. The Nash equilibrium can be
obtained by solving the best response function, which is
the optimal strategy of one player given the others’ strategy
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choices. That is, the best response function of tenant j can be
formulated as:
BRj(S−j) = argmax
sj
πj(S), (4)
where S = [dij ], ∀1 ≤ i ≤ M, and 1 ≤ j ≤ N denotes the
strategy matrix of all tenant users and S−j = [dik] with i = j
represents the strategy matrix of all tenants except tenant j.
Denote by S∗ = {s∗1, · · · , s∗j , · · · , s∗N} the Nash equilib-
rium of the noncooperative resource procurement game. Then,
we have:
s∗j = BRi(S
∗
−j), ∀j. (5)
where the Nash equilibrium is given by the best response
function. To this end, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium
by solving the following equation array:
∂πj(sj)
∂dij
= bij − α− β ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dij
⎞
⎠
τ
−β · τ ·
M∑
i=1
dij ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dij
⎞
⎠
τ−1
= 0. (6)
The solution S∗ of the above equations is a Nash equi-
librium. In practice, the tenant consumers set their optimal
demand levels using the Nash equilibrium, given the pricing
policies of the cloud broker. When all the strategies among
all the tenant users are available in a centralized manner, the
Nash equilibrium can be solved numerically by:
min
S0
N∑
j=1
|sj −BRj(S−j)|, (7)
where |x| is the norm of vector x. That is, the Nash equilib-
rium can be solved by minimizing the sum of the differences
between dij and the corresponding value obtained via best
response functions. The closer to 0 the objective function is,
the more accurate of the numerical solution.
In the following theorem, we investigate the analytical
solution of Nash equilibrium for the special case of M = 1.
That is, bij = bj and dij = dj , ∀i.
THEOREM 1. For the special case of M = 1, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium given by
d∗j = (
bj − α
β · τ ·Qτ−1 −
Q
τ
)+, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ M, (8)
where Q =
∑N
j=1 bj−α·N
β·(N+τ) and (x)
+ = max(x, 0).
Proof. From Equation array 6, we get
∂πj(sj)
∂dj
= bj − α− β ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dj
⎞
⎠
τ
−β · τ · dj ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dj
⎞
⎠
τ−1
= 0. (9)
Summing up the left side and the right side of the above
equations, we have
N∑
j=1
bj − α ·N − β ·N ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dj
⎞
⎠
τ
−β · τ ·
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
dj
⎞
⎠
τ
= 0. (10)
Suppose that Q =
∑N
j=1 dj . We can readily get
Q =
(∑N
j=1 bj − α ·N
β · (N + τ)
)1/τ
. (11)
Substitute Q into Equation 9, we obtain the unique Nash
equilibrium:
dj =
bj − α
β · τ ·Qτ−1 −
Q
τ
. (12)
However, this is on that condition that
dj =
bj − α
β · τ ·Qτ−1 −
Q
τ
≥ 0; (13)
otherwise, the best response of tenant j is dj = 0. To sum it
up, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium:
d∗j = max(
bj − α
β · τ ·Qτ−1 −
Q
τ
, 0). (14)
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation results of our
proposed game model and learning algorithms in our dynamic
game.
A. Setup
We consider a cloud system with one cloud broker and
two tenant users procuring virtual instances from the broker
(i.e., M = 1 and N = 2) so as to get clear insights
about competitive cloud resource procurements. For the cloud
pricing model, we use α = 0 and β = 1.
B. Equilibrium Analysis
We ﬁrst examine Nash equilibrium and the impact of
network delay in Fig. 1 for the special case of two tenant users.
In our game model, the best response of one tenant consumer
is a linear function of the strategy of the other tenant user. The
Nash equilibrium can be calculated by the intersection point
of the best response functions of the two tenant users. Here,
we investigate the impact of network delay on the equilibrium
demand levels. With the decrease of network delay (i.e., better
service quality), the corresponding tenant user would like to
procure more resources from the cloud broker. On the other
hand, the network delay of one tenant user affects the other’s
procurement of cloud resources. This clearly explains the
impact of network delay and the interactions among tenants
for resource procurements, when a large number of tenants
coexist in the cloud system.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of Nash equilibrium with two tenant users: best response functions.
V. RELATED WORK
Pricing has been discussed for more than a decade by com-
puter scientists for network resource allocation [11]. Recently,
cloud resource pricing is widely adopted as the dominant
resource allocation scheme in a cloud computing environment
with multi-tenancy. Therefore, there already exist some studies
on pricing scheme design and tenant resource procurements.
Wang et al. [12] examine the importance of cloud resource
pricing from the perspective of economics. Due to the co-
existence of spot pricing and usage based pricing, Wang et
al. [13] investigate optimal data center capacity segmentation
between both pricing schemes with the objective of total cloud
revenue maximization. Niu et al. [14], [15] propose a pricing
scheme to better leverage the demand correlation among tenant
consumers with VoD trafﬁc and argue the necessity of brokers
in a free cloud market. Most recently, Xu et al. [17] propose
centralized schemes so as to maximize the revenue of the
cloud provider. Wang et al. [10] investigate dynamic resource
reservation via cloud brokers. Wang et al. further discuss
optimal resource reservation with multiple purchasing options
in IaaS clouds in [18]. While the above studies acknowledge
the dominant role of the cloud provider and brokers in pricing,
they ignore the competitive cloud resource procurements and
its impact on broker revenue and pricing.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we explore the problem of competitive cloud
resource procurements in a cloud broker market. We realisti-
cally model the pricing scheme of the cloud broker and tenant
surplus. We propose a noncooperative game to model such
competitive resource procurements. We then conduct equilib-
rium analysis under the assumption of perfect information.
To relax the assumption of perfect information, we propose
the adoption of dynamic game to reach Nash equilibrium in a
distributed manner by using local information only. The results
revealed insightful observations for practical pricing scheme
design. In the future, we would like to extend our model to
the more general case of an interrelated market formulated by
the cloud provider, brokers, and tenant consumers.
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